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Abstract 
Decision-makers faced with an opportunity to learn the outcome of a foregone 
alternative must balance anticipated regret, should that information be unfavorable, with 
the potential benefits of this information in reducing experienced regret.  Counterfactual-
seeking, the choice to learn more about foregone alternatives, may be a functional, regret-
regulating strategy for individuals already experiencing regret.  Counterfactual-seeking 
increases in response to dissatisfying outcomes (Studies 1 & 2).  Counterfactual-seeking 
is generally able to reduce dissatisfaction (Study 2), regardless of whether individuals 
personally chose to view this information or were randomly assigned to do so (Study 3).  
Moreover, both imaginative (versus factual) thoughts about the foregone option and 
upward (versus downward) counterfactual thoughts play a role in this improvement in 
satisfaction (Study 4).  Regret thus has a complex influence in how individuals engage 
with counterfactual information.   
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Counterfactual seeking: The scenic overlook of the road not taken 
 
Life is uncertain, and the decisions we make are often among the largest sources 
of uncertainty.  What career will make me happiest?  Which car will provide the best 
value for my money?   Moreover, after making a decision, we may still be left uncertain 
whether the outcome of that decision was in fact the best that we could have done.  
Would I have been happier as a lawyer than as an academic?  Might the other car have 
needed fewer repairs?  The current research examines how individuals respond to the 
opportunity to obtain information about foregone options, a phenomenon I term 
counterfactual-seeking1.  Under what circumstances will individuals choose to learn 
about foregone alternatives, and what are the consequences of seeking this information? 
The decision to counterfactual-seek hinges on the balance of two motivations. 
Regret regulation theory (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007) highlights a need for decision-
makers to manage their emotional state by avoiding and reducing regret, whereas the 
functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008) suggests that this 
emotion, and the counterfactual thoughts that underlie it, have benefits to the decision-
maker.  Decision makers thus have to balance experienced regret with the anticipated 
potential for further regret from counterfactual-seeking, on the one hand, and the 
possibility of this information instead alleviating their regret, on the other.  As shown in 
Figure 1, I predict that counterfactual seeking is more likely following dissatisfying 
outcomes (Studies 1-2), and will reduce regret (Studies 2-3) due in part to changes in 
counterfactual thoughts (Study 4) within counterfactual-seekers. 
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Regret regulation 
Regret regulation theory (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007) suggests that regret can 
exist in an anticipatory form, particularly when information about foregone alternatives 
will be available, and that decision-makers are motivated to minimize this anticipated 
regret.  In an initial demonstration of regret aversion, Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Plight, 
and de Vries (1996) gave participants a choice of two gambles (A and B).  Participants 
were told they would learn the outcome of a particular gamble (gamble A), regardless of 
whether they chose that gamble (A) or an alternative gamble (B).  Participants tended to 
choose gamble A, thereby insulating themselves from knowing the outcome of a 
foregone gamble (i.e., choosing gamble B and also learning the outcome of gamble A), 
providing evidence for a pattern of aversion towards anticipated regret and a resulting 
avoidance of counterfactual information. Likewise, outside the regret literature, Sweeny, 
Melnyk, Miller, and Shepperd (2010) argue that individuals will avoid information if 
doing so will help them avoid negative emotional states.  This might suggest that 
individuals will generally avoid information about foregone alternatives. 
In addition to the desire to avoid anticipated regret, however, regret regulation 
theory also suggests that individuals will attempt to reduce experienced regret.  The post-
decisional dissonance literature has demonstrated that individuals will reduce initial 
dissatisfaction with a chosen option by devaluing the foregone alternative (Brehm, 1956; 
Festinger & Walster, 1964).   In decision contexts in which individuals have limited 
negative information about foregone options (for instance, when one has only seen the 
glossy brochure and shiny showroom model of a foregone car), it may be difficult to 
devalue the foregone option without additional information about its negative qualities.  
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If these decision-makers are dissatisfied, the most likely way to improve satisfaction by 
improving the relative standing of a chosen option compared to a foregone option would 
be to seek out information about the foregone alternative that has the potential to cast the 
chosen option in a relatively more favorable light—that is, to counterfactual-seek.  In the 
gambles used by Zeelenberg and colleagues to demonstrate regret aversion, individuals 
could anticipate potentially experiencing regret, but since the decision had not yet been 
made, post-decisional regret necessarily could not exist at the time that counterfactual 
information was sought or avoided. Anticipated regret therefore dominates the decision 
process, resulting in a pattern of regret-aversion.  In contrast, in daily life, the decision 
usually has been made and the outcome is known prior to an individual’s decision to seek 
versus avoid counterfactual information.  For instance, one can ask a friend about her 
satisfaction with her Ford even after one has bought a Toyota, in contrast to the 
constraints in Zeelenberg et al.’s (1996) task.  
In fact, recent research has found that individuals reading hypothetical scenarios 
that imply greater regret with a decision’s outcome express more interest in learning 
about foregone possibilities. Shani, Tykocinski, and Zeelenberg (2008) found that 
participants who read a vignette in which it was highly probable (vs. unlikely) that they 
had missed out on a prize reported more interest in the counterfactual outcome (i.e., 
whether or not their unsubmitted form had the winning numbers). This effect was 
mediated by greater dissatisfaction among participants who thought the prize was more 
(vs. less) likely, which in turn predicted the level of curiosity about their entry form.  
Likewise, participants who read a vignette in which they were responsible for a bad 
investment were less satisfied with this outcome than participants who read a vignette in 
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which another person was responsible for the investment, and were subsequently more 
likely to express interest in learning about a foregone investment (Shani & Zeelenberg, 
2007).   Thus, in scenarios implying greater regret (whether driven by a more easily 
imagined alternative or greater personal responsibility), individuals express more interest 
in the foregone outcome.  
The current research therefore expands on the tenet of regret regulation theory 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007) that regret exists in both anticipatory and experienced forms 
to examine how these two forms of regret simultaneously influence the decision to 
counterfactual seek.  Given that experienced emotions have strong motivational effects 
(Frijda, 1986), I predict that experienced regret will lead to counterfactual seeking, even 
in the face of anticipated regret about that information (Figure 1, Step 1). 
The benefits of counterfactuals 
If counterfactual-seeking is motivated by an attempt to reduce experienced regret, 
it should have direct or indirect affective benefits to seekers. Research indeed suggests 
counterfactual-seeking by dissatisfied individuals would be quite functional. Both 
counterfactual thinking (thoughts about “what might have been”) and regret, the negative 
emotion driven by counterfactual thoughts about one’s own behavior (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997), can be highly beneficial, as highlighted by the functional 
theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  Counterfactual thoughts play 
a role in causal reasoning (Wells & Gavanski, 1989), and more importantly, help people 
feel better about outcomes and improve future outcomes (Roese, 1994).  This ability to 
improve outcomes occurs even on a relatively automatic level; counterfactuals facilitate 
formation of behavioral intentions (e.g., to wear sunscreen to avoid future sunburns; 
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Smallman & Roese, 2009). Likewise, regret highlights decision strategies and behaviors 
that had poor outcomes, creating an impetus to alter behavior to improve outcomes 
(Landman, 1993; Zeelenberg, Inman, & Pieters, 2001).  For instance, regret following an 
unpleasant experience with a service provider predicts switching providers (Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 1999).  For this reason, individuals do not view regret as being uniformly 
aversive.  Instead, they endorse regret more highly than twelve other negative emotions 
(e.g., sadness, anger, disappointment) on a range of beneficial functions (Saffrey, 
Summerville, & Roese, 2008).  Counterfactual-seekers could thus expect a range of 
benefits for future outcomes as a result of learning about foregone options.   
In addition to these longer-term benefits, counterfactual seeking may be able to 
improve satisfaction in the short run.  Satisfaction with a decision is based not only on the 
absolute quality of the chosen option but on its relative standing compared to real or 
imagined foregone alternatives (Aronson, 1969).  Counterfactual-seeking may shift the 
nature of this comparative evaluation (Figure 1, Step 2).  First, counterfactual seeking 
may reveal information that makes the chosen option clearly superior to the other (my 
hotel was dingy, but the one I almost stayed in instead had bedbugs), and change this 
comparison from one that is upward (focused on how the alternative would have been 
better) to one that is downward (focused on how the alternative would have been worse).  
Second, in addition to describing what would have been (i.e., a factual contrast between 
the actual attributes of the chosen and foregone options), counterfactuals can also be 
characterized by supposition and imagination—the comparison to what might have been.  
Car buyers might imagine, for instance, finding the Platonic ideal of cars—if only they 
had kept looking, they might have found a car in their price range, with better mileage, 
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more features, more room, and a better warranty.  Since it is unlikely for any car to meet 
this ideal, having information about a foregone alternative—even if this alternative is still 
superior to the obtained outcome—may reduce regret by highlighting that the difference 
between the obtained outcome and the available alternative outcome (i.e., what would 
have been) is substantially smaller than the difference between the obtained outcome and 
the imagined (and idealized) alternative outcome (what might have been).  Thus, the 
degree of dissatisfaction experienced would be reduced in comparisons to available 
alternatives versus to imagined alternatives, even if it is not eliminated.  For instance, car 
buyers may shift from imagining that they would have found a more spacious car with a 
better warranty and more features for less money to realizing that the other cars in their 
price range all offer about the same amount of space and features; in turn, this should 
reduce the extent to which their thoughts involve upward comparisons and increase the 
extent to which they involve downward comparisons.  
In short, I predict that counterfactual seeking will change the imaginative vs. 
factual nature of the thoughts that individuals have about the foregone options (Figure 1, 
Step 2).  Moreover, these changes will be accompanied by changes in counterfactual 
thoughts, such that comparisons become less upward and more downward (Step 3).  I 
predict that these cognitive effects will produce changes in satisfaction, as in Step 4 of 
Figure 1.  Given the myriad regret regulation strategies identified by Zeelenberg and 
Pieters (2007), and the range of benefits from counterfactuals (Epstude & Roese, 2008), it 
is unlikely that cognitive changes are the only means by which counterfactual-seeking 
has an influence on satisfaction; rather, many other mechanisms may simultaneously 
contribute to this effect of counterfactual-seeking on improved satisfaction. 
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The current research 
The existing scenario studies (Shani & Zeelenberg, 2007; Shani, Tykocinski, and 
Zeelenberg, 2008) support the prediction that the experience of regret following a 
decision may lead individuals to counterfactual-seek. However, these past findings are 
somewhat limited by the fact that they present decisions in the scenarios as a fait 
accompli and ask participants to imagine how they might respond.  This leaves open the 
possibility that participants believe that the action they have purportedly taken in the 
scenario is not a decision they would have actually made, and yet have to predict what 
they would then do.  Moreover, requiring participants to predict their future actions, and 
particularly their future emotions, is often unreliable (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998; Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2003).  Therefore, the present research introduces a new paradigm in which 
participants make a decision between hypothetical options and then choose to see or 
avoid information about foregone alternatives, rather than simply expressing interest on a 
Likert scale. Research on romantic relationships has demonstrated that hypothetical 
decisions about an interaction with a romantic partner are related to attachment style and 
to real relationship outcomes, supporting the value of these simulated decisions in 
understanding real behavior (Vicary & Fraley, 2007). 
Across four studies, the current research investigates the causes and consequences 
of counterfactual-seeking, suggesting that it is a regulatory response to dissatisfaction that 
reduces regret by producing changes in counterfactual thoughts. I predict that both 
objectively poor outcomes and subjective dissatisfaction following a choice (post-
decisional regret) will drive increased counterfactual-seeking (Step 1, Figure 1).  
Moreover, I predict that this will be functional in reducing post-decisional regret after a 
COUNTERFACTUAL SEEKING 10 
bad choice (Step 4, Figure 1) because it will shift cognitions away from the nearly 
impossibly good alternatives that can be imagined (a car that looks like a Ferrari, with the 
engineering of a BMW, at the cost of a used Camry) to the more realistic trade-offs that 
are normally encountered in the real world (a used Camry that looks and runs like a 
Camry) and produce a reduction in upward counterfactuals and increase in downward 
counterfactuals (Steps 2 and 3, Figure 1). 
In Studies 1 and 2, I investigate whether worse outcomes and greater 
dissatisfaction directly influence the likelihood of actually choosing to view information 
about foregone alternatives.  In Study 1, I predict that participants in a computerized card 
game will be more likely to look at the foregone “hand” if their actual hand is relatively 
weak.  In Study 2, I predict that participants who selected a hypothetical course that was 
revealed to have had low student evaluations, and who were highly dissatisfied, will be 
more likely to seek information about the foregone courses.  In Study 2, I also investigate 
whether individuals do in fact show improved satisfaction after learning about foregone 
options, and whether this effect is moderated by the discrepancy in objective quality 
between the actual and foregone options.  In Study 3, I use an experimental approach to 
examine whether this improvement in satisfaction is due to self-selection by 
counterfactual seekers, or whether counterfactual information improves satisfaction 
regardless of whether an individual has requested to see it.  Finally, Study 4 examines the 
role of counterfactual thoughts in this change in satisfaction.  I predict that although 
participants’ thoughts about the foregone option will be relatively more imaginative than 
factual initially (i.e., more focused on what might have been than what would have been), 
this ratio will shift to show relatively more factual thoughts following counterfactual-
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seeking.  Furthermore, I anticipate that counterfactual seeking will produce a reduction in 
upward counterfactuals and an increase in downward counterfactuals, which will in turn 
predict increased satisfaction.  Together, these four studies illustrate that counterfactual-
seeking is an adaptive response to dissatisfaction that results from balancing the influence 
of anticipated and experienced regret. 
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to provide preliminary evidence that worse outcomes after a 
decision will increase counterfactual-seeking. Of particular interest was whether 
participants whose choice led to a relatively poor outcome (i.e., a bad score) would be 
more likely to choose to view foregone alternatives, relative to participants whose choice 
led to a good outcome (i.e., a higher score). 
Method 
 Sixty-five introductory psychology students participated in lab sessions for course 
credit. 
Participants played 100 rounds of a computerized card game (broken into 5 
“games” of 20 rounds per game in order to alleviate fatigue).  Participants were first 
informed of the rules of the game: red cards (diamond or heart) LOST the number of 
points on the card (1 to 10), and black cards (spade or club) GAINED the number of 
points on the card.  In each round, they drew a single card from one of two shuffled 
decks, each with face cards removed. For each trial, the obtained score was thus a non-
zero integer from -10 to +10.  After seeing this card, participants were asked if they 
wished to view the card they would have drawn from the other deck. Whether or not they 
elected to view this foregone card represented the dichotomous dependent measure of 
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counterfactual-seeking.  For participants who did elect to view the foregone card, the 
counterfactual outcome represented by this card (i.e., the points they would have 
gained/lost had they selected the other deck) could likewise be any non-zero integer from 
-10 to +10; both cards were randomly generated by the computer.  Participants then 
proceeded to the next round.  The computer displayed information about which round of 
which game the participant was on, the current net score for the game, and (for games 2-
5) the highest score of the previous games.  Participants were told that the card(s) were 
replaced and the decks reshuffled between rounds.  
Results and Discussion 
 Study 1 tested the hypothesis that decision outcome would affect counterfactual-
seeking, with worse outcomes increasing the likelihood of seeking counterfactual 
information.  If this is the case, a significant negative relationship should be observed 
between the score on a given round and the likelihood of counterfactual-seeking. Because 
of the repeated-measures design, the obtained data are dependent in nature. To account 
for this interdependence and model a dichotomous outcome, I used a hierarchical logistic 
regression strategy (HLM software, Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2007), nesting trials 
within participants while predicting the logit of the counterfactual-seeking outcome 
variable.  As predicted, worse outcome quality (i.e., greater losses and smaller gains) 
significantly increased the likelihood of counterfactual-seeking, π = -0.04, F(1, 6252) = 
24.93, p < .001, odds ratio = 0.96.  
The results of Study 1 supported the hypothesis that counterfactual-seeking would 
be increased by poorer decision outcomes. In this case, the worse the outcome of 
participants’ choices, the more they sought out knowledge about the forgone outcome.  
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Study 2 expands upon this result by assessing experienced dissatisfaction, as well as 
investigating the ability of counterfactual information to improve satisfaction. 
Study 2 
Although Study 1 found that objectively poor outcomes increase counterfactual-
seeking, it does not speak to the psychological mechanisms that underlie counterfactual-
seeking.  Study 2 examines this directly.  Additionally, Study 2 examined whether 
counterfactual-seeking is a functional strategy to improve satisfaction.  While the 
content-specific effects of counterfactuals suggest that long term benefits could exist 
even if satisfaction is not improved (e.g., having conclusive evidence that another brand 
is better will result in a better decision on the next shopping trip; Epstude & Roese, 
2008), I predict that counterfactual information will also be able to improve satisfaction 
in the short term. 
Method 
Three-hundred and ninety-eight introductory social psychology students 
participated in a web-based study for course credit.  
Participants were asked to imagine that the psychology department would hire 
one of three (fictional) candidates as a visiting professor to teach an elective course next 
semester, for which the course title and catalogue description were displayed, along with 
the professor’s name and a photo. After selecting the course they personally would most 
like to take, and confirming this choice, participants read comments and numeric ratings 
made by past students in that course.  Participants were randomly assigned to read one of 
five reviews corresponding to five levels of instructor quality (i.e., means of 
approximately 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 on 5-point rating scales).  These reviews consisted of 
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numeric rating of items such as “gained a lot from this class” and “would recommend to 
others” and verbal comments such as “Lectures were really boring, and slides always had 
typos and grammatical errors and sometimes didn't really make sense at all” (instructor 
rated 1 on scale of 5);  “Sometimes comes off as unprepared in class. Good during office 
hours though” (instructor rated 3 on scale of 5); and “Interesting and funny lecturer, not 
only teaches the concepts but outlines the studies that led to the knowledge” (instructor 
rated 5 on scale of 5).   
After seeing this review, participants then rated their regret and satisfaction 
(reversed) on 7-point scales; these variables were highly correlated (r = .68) and thus 
averaged into a single dissatisfaction variable. Additionally, they indicated their curiosity 
about foregone alternatives (“I am curious about the courses/professors I did not select”) 
and the aversiveness of this information (“It would upset me to think about the 
courses/professors I did not select”).  Next, participants could read a review for one of the 
foregone courses.  Whether or not they elected to view this information represented the 
dichotomous dependent measure of counterfactual-seeking.  Participants viewing this 
information were again randomly assigned to the quality of the foregone alternative (1, 3, 
or 5 out of 5 on the same rating scale), to examine the boundary conditions for an 
improvement in satisfaction.  These participants were then asked to re-rate their 
satisfaction, “now that you’ve had the opportunity to learn about another course.” Finally, 
participants completed the five-item Schwartz et al. (2002) regret-proneness scale (items 
include such statements as “Whenever I make a choice, I'm curious about what would 
have happened if I had chosen differently”) and three items assessing the belief that 
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regret has a beneficial function (e.g., “Feeling regret helps me learn from my mistakes.”)  
Reliabilities for the two scales were acceptable (αs = .74 and .69, respectively).   
Results  
Study 2 tested the prediction that subjective dissatisfaction, and not merely 
negative outcomes per se, leads to counterfactual-seeking. The 5 different reviews of the 
chosen professor were coded as an objective outcome quality variable ranging from 0 to 
4. The effect of objective outcome quality on counterfactual-seeking in Study 1 was 
replicated, with better outcomes associated with lower likelihood of seeking β = -0.14, 
Wald = 3.67, p = .05, odds ratio = 0.87.  Objective outcome quality was strongly, but not 
perfectly, correlated with dissatisfaction, r = -.74, suggesting that although the 
manipulation was effective, individuals had idiosyncratic reactions to the reviews. As 
predicted, therefore, greater dissatisfaction, and not merely objective outcome quality, 
was associated with higher rates of counterfactual-seeking, β = 0.12, Wald = 4.56, p = 
.03, odds ratio = 1.13.  
Examining the rated aversiveness of counterfactual information suggested that 
counterfactual-seeking does not result from a simple absence of regret-aversion; instead, 
experienced and anticipated regret may co-exist, as predicted by regret regulation theory. 
The more dissatisfied participants were with their choice, the more they reported that they 
would be upset if they thought about the course/professors not selected (r = .53, p < 
.001), indicating that they felt anticipatory regret about counterfactual seeking as well as 
experienced regret about their decision.   Dissatisfied participants were nonetheless more 
curious about counterfactual information (r = .54, p < .001), indicating that as predicted, 
experienced regret outweighed anticipated regret.  In fact, the degree to which 
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participants expected to find counterfactual information upsetting was positively 
associated with their curiosity about these outcomes (r =  .48, p < .001) and their 
tendency to view this information (point-biserial r = .22, p < .001); this effect was 
weakened (though still significant, due to the large sample size) when controlling for 
satisfaction (point-biserial r = .18, p < .001).  
If individuals with a greater dispositional tendency to experience regret were 
more likely to use the regret regulation strategy of counterfactual-seeking, this would 
further support the key role of experienced regret in this phenomenon. Correspondingly, 
trait level regret-proneness was associated with counterfactual-seeking, such that an 
increased tendency to feel regret predicted increased counterfactual-seeking, β = 0.44, 
Wald = 19.5, p < .001, odds ratio = 1.55.  Likewise, individuals who see regret as 
generally beneficial (i.e., who are generally low in anticipatory regret) should be more 
likely to seek counterfactual information.  Further supporting a regulatory function for 
counterfactual-seeking, positive beliefs about regret were marginally associated with an 
increased tendency to counterfactual-seek, β = 0.15, Wald = 3.53, p = .06, odds ratio = 
1.16. The anticipated unpleasantness of counterfactual information may be reframed by 
these individuals and thus increase its value, just as one might reframe a negative 
experience of missing the bus into the thought “well, at least I’ll get some exercise.” 
The role of experienced dissatisfaction in prompting counterfactual-seeking 
would be particularly functional if counterfactual-seeking improves satisfaction.  As 
predicted, among those who sought counterfactual information, dissatisfaction decreased 
significantly after viewing this information (Ms = 3.63 vs. 3.27), t (142) = 3.61, p < .001, 
d = 0.19.  Unsurprisingly, this effect was qualified by the discrepancy in objective 
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outcome quality of the chosen and foregone options.  An objective discrepancy score was 
computed by subtracting the objective outcome quality of the chosen option (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) 
from the objective outcome quality of the foregone option (0, 2, 4); this discrepancy score 
could thus range from -4 to +4, indicating that the chosen option was objectively much 
worse to much better than the foregone option.   The objective discrepancy score was a 
significant predictor of post-seeking dissatisfaction, controlling for initial dissatisfaction, 
β = -0.43, t (89) = 6.13, p < .001.  Unpacking this effect by examining the difference in 
dissatisfaction before and after seeking counterfactual information within each level of 
outcome discrepancy revealed that the only significant differences were decreases in 
dissatisfaction when the two outcomes were equivalent or the chosen option was between 
1 and 3 points better on the 5-point scale.  (Those participants who had a + 4-point gap—
which would only occur if they had gotten the most favorable review of the chosen 
professor, and the most unfavorable review of the foregone professor—appeared to show 
a floor effect for dissatisfaction, with Ms = 1.29 vs. 1.25 initially and post-seeking, 
respectively, p = .59, d = 0.07).  Notably, those participants who discovered the foregone 
alternative was objectively superior to the chosen option did not show significant 
increases in dissatisfaction (for objective discrepancies of - 2 points or more, all p > .30).  
In fact, descriptively, those participants with a -1-point objective discrepancy score (i.e., 
the foregone alternative was objectively 1 point better than the chosen option on a 5-point 
scale) still showed a decrease in dissatisfaction (Ms = 4.29 vs. 3.91), though this effect 
was non-significant, t(16) = 1.28, p = .22, d = 0.22. Thus, counterfactual-seeking appears 
to carry a possible benefit of improving satisfaction without a corresponding risk of 
increasing dissatisfaction. 
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Discussion 
Study 2 extends the effects of objective outcome in Study 1 to find an effect of 
subjective satisfaction on counterfactual seeking.  Moreover, this experienced emotion 
outweighed anticipated regret in the decision to counterfactual-seek, as seekers actually 
expected to be more upset by counterfactual information (but, clearly, sought it out 
nonetheless). One interpretation of this result is that individuals were fully aware of the 
potentially aversive nature of counterfactual information, yet were still willing to engage 
in counterfactual-seeking, consistent with Shani and colleagues’ framing of this behavior 
as a “search for unpleasant truths” (Shani, Tykocinski, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Shani & 
Zeelenberg, 2007). This suggests that experienced dissatisfaction with the selected 
alternative may be more powerful than anticipated dissatisfaction in the decision to 
counterfactual-seek, consistent with the fact that experienced emotions are strong 
motivators (Frijda, 1986). Additionally, Sweeny et al. (2010) cite unpublished evidence 
that suggests that it is the relative levels of anticipated regret about learning information 
and about not learning this information that drives information avoidance, rather than 
either absolute level.  The current results suggest that experienced emotion may also be 
directly weighted in this calculus, or that individuals use experienced emotion as a proxy 
to predict their anticipated regret of continuing to not know the foregone outcome.  
Alternatively, this correlation could result from participants “bracing” for this 
information and exaggerating the potential negative consequences of their desire to seek 
this information.  However, participants were not aware when rating their interest and 
aversion to this information that they would actually have the opportunity to decide to 
COUNTERFACTUAL SEEKING 19 
seek this information, raising potential doubts about whether they could have used an 
anticipatory strategy. 
Finally, Study 2 illustrated that, as predicted, counterfactual-seeking significantly 
improved satisfaction for most participants who saw an equivalent or inferior foregone 
option, and that even those who learned that the foregone option was better than the 
chosen option were not significantly less satisfied with their choice, supporting the 
hypothesis that counterfactual seeking is a functional, regret-regulating strategy. 
Study 3 
Study 2 showed an improvement in satisfaction among most counterfactual-
seekers.  However, counterfactual-seekers were a self-selected population, and not 
randomly assigned.  It is therefore possible that the benefits of counterfactual seeking are 
limited to those who are deliberately seeking this information, and that those who choose 
to avoid this information are self-diagnosing based on knowledge that they will not share 
these benefits.  Moreover, because a second satisfaction rating was not obtained among 
non-seekers, the changes in satisfaction in Study 2 could be due to an effect of time, 
rather than counterfactual information.  Study 3 therefore experimentally manipulated 
whether participants self-selected to seek or not seek (as in Studies 1 and 2) or were 
assigned by the experimenter to view or not view this information.  Additionally, Study 3 
examined the changes in satisfaction among all participants, not just those who viewed 
counterfactual information.  
Method 
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 One hundred seventy seven participants were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website and paid 25 cents for their participation (see Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011, for more information about Mechanichal Turk).   
Participants were told to imagine that they were planning a trip to a beach with a 
group of friends.  After seeing an attractive photograph with a brief description of each 
resort’s amenities, they were asked to choose which hotel they would most want to visit.  
They were then given feedback about the chosen hotel in the form of a summary of a 
customer review that was somewhat unfavorable in tone.  They then rated their 
satisfaction with the hotel.   
Participants were then randomly assigned to the free choice or experimenter-
assigned condition. Participants in the free choice condition, as in Study 2, were given 
the choice of whether to read a review of a foregone option.  Those who elected to read 
this information (i.e., counterfactual-seekers) were shown a customer review of one of 
the two foregone hotels that was also largely unfavorable. The content of the two reviews 
(i.e., which review text was associated with the chosen vs. foregone hotel) was 
counterbalanced across participants.  Participants who did not read this information (i.e., 
non-seekers) continued to the next phase of the experiment.   
Participants in the experimenter-assigned condition were further randomly 
assigned to either read a review of the foregone alternative, or did not read this 
information and continued on to the next phase.  Other than being randomly assigned, 
rather than self-selected, the experimenter-assigned conditions were identical to the free 
choice conditions. 
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Finally, participants in all four conditions were asked to re-rate their satisfaction 
with their initially chosen hotel. 
Results  
The key question in this study was whether readers in both the free choice and 
experimenter-assigned conditions experienced a change in satisfaction, or whether this 
change was qualified by an interaction of the two conditions (free choice vs. 
experimenter-assigned X read vs. did not read).  Such an interaction could indicate that 
counterfactual-seekers might be self-selecting based on whether or not they anticipated 
benefiting from the information, or that the act of choosing to view information 
contributed to this effect.   
A 2 (Time 1 vs. Time 2) x 2 (read vs. did not read) X 2 (experimenter-assigned 
vs. free choice) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of time, with 
satisfaction improving from Time 1 to Time 2, as expected, F(1, 173) = 6.12,  p = .01, ηp2 
= .03. This was qualified by the predicted interaction with reading condition, F(1, 173) = 
4.54,  p = .03, ηp2 = .03.  As can be seen in Figure 2, satisfaction improved for readers 
(t(96) = 2.57, p = .01, d = 0.24) but not for non-readers (t(104) = 1.01, p = .32, d = 0.03).  
Most importantly, this two-way interaction was not qualified by an interaction with 
assignment, F(1, 173) = 0.54, p = .36, ηp2 = .005, indicating that the benefits of 
counterfactual information were not limited to those who self-selected to seek this 
information.  
Discussion 
Obtaining counterfactual information increased post-decisional satisfaction, 
regardless of whether the counterfactual information was voluntarily sought or not.  This 
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indicates that the benefits of counterfactual information are not isolated to the subset of 
participants who voluntarily seek out the information.  More importantly, this also 
indicates that it is not the act of counterfactual-seeking, but rather counterfactual 
information, that provides the benefit to satisfaction observed in Study 2. 
Study 4 
Study 2 demonstrated that counterfactual-seeking can improve satisfaction, and 
Study 3 illustrated that this effect was due to the counterfactual information itself rather 
than the decision to seek it out.  Study 4 builds upon these previous findings by 
examining whether changes in the nature of participants’ thoughts are partially 
responsible for this increase in satisfaction caused by counterfactual-seeking.   
As previously noted, even an upward counterfactual comparison (in which the 
foregone alternative is superior to the obtained outcome) can improve satisfaction if the 
comparison target shifts from the imagined ideal alternative (the brand new BMW that 
costs less than a used Camry) to having a more realistic comparison target of the actually 
available alternatives (the features, mileage, and safety records of mid-size sedans in a 
given price range are all fairly similar).  To the extent that counterfactual-seeking is able 
to reduce dissatisfaction, it should produce changes in the thoughts that individuals have 
about their initial decision. I therefore expect that factual thoughts about foregone options 
will increase following counterfactual-seeking, and imaginative thoughts about foregone 
options will decrease following counterfactual-seeking.  More importantly, I predict that 
upward counterfactuals, focused on how the foregone alternative could have been better, 
will decrease, and that downward counterfactuals, focused on how an alternative could 
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have been worse, will increase, and that these changes will be associated with changes in 
satisfaction. 
Method 
One hundred forty-seven participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk website and paid 25 cents for their participation. Potential participants were 
excluded from participation if they had participated in the research described in Study 3.   
Participants were told to imagine that they were selecting one of three mobile 
phones that would be free with their contract, and saw pictures of three smartphones with 
brief descriptions of their capabilities (e.g., plays MP3s).  After selecting their preferred 
phone, participants read a review and numeric ratings of the phone that were somewhat 
unfavorable in tone (a mix of numeric ratings near 1 and 3 on a 5 point scale of call 
quality, ease of use, etc., with corresponding comments).   
After reading this review, participants were asked to briefly describe their 
thoughts, and then were asked to self-code these thoughts on several dimensions by rating 
their agreement with the extent to which each dimension described their thoughts.  (All 
ratings were made on 7-point Likert scales.)   The focal ratings were imaginative 
thoughts about one or more foregone phones (“Right now, I am using my imagination to 
envision what the other phones I could have selected might have been like”) and factual 
thoughts about one or more foregone phones (“…focused on the facts that I know about 
the phone I did not select.”)  Participants were also asked to rate their satisfaction with 
their selected phone. Additionally, participants rated the extent to which they were 
focused on upward counterfactual thoughts (“I am thinking how things might have been 
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better if I had made another choice”) and downward counterfactuals (“…how things 
might have been worse…”). 
Following this, participants were asked if they wished to see a review of one of 
the phones they had not selected, which was the dichotomous measure of counterfactual-
seeking.  Those participants who elected to see this information read another review that 
was likewise somewhat unfavorable in nature and had numeric ratings that were again a 
mix of values near 1 and 3.  The content of these two reviews (i.e. which review text and 
table was associated with the chosen vs. foregone phone) was counterbalanced across 
participants.  All participants, whether or not they viewed this information, were asked to 
again describe their thoughts and provide the same self-codings and satisfaction ratings.   
Results 
 Effects on thought content. I predicted that following counterfactual-seeking, 
thoughts about the foregone option would become relatively more factual and less 
imaginative in nature, and that these changes would be attenuated or not occur among 
those who did not seek.  I therefore conducted a 2 (seek vs. did not seek) x 2 (thought 
type: imaginative vs. factual) x 2 (Time 1 vs. Time 2) repeated-measures ANOVA, which 
revealed the predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 131) = 11.48, p = .001, ηp2 = .08; see 
Figure 3. For non-seekers, imaginative thoughts were more prevalent than factual 
thoughts both initially (Ms = 4.41 vs. 3.24, t(93) = 6.43, p < .001, d = 0.62) and at time 2 
(Ms = 3.75 vs. 3.01, t(87) = 4.31, p < .001, d = 0.38).  In contrast, although seekers 
showed the same preponderance of imaginative versus factual thoughts initially (Ms = 
4.76 vs. 3.14, t(50) = 7.00, p < .001, d = 0.96), their thoughts after seeking showed no 
such difference (Ms = 4.24 vs. 4.09, t(45) = 0.71, p = .48, d = 0.08).  Further analysis 
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revealed that, as predicted, seekers showed an increase in factual thoughts (t(44) = 3.47, p 
= .001, d = 0.55); the decrease in imaginative thoughts failed to attain significance (t(44) 
= 1.47, p = .15, d = 0.23). 
Effects on counterfactuals. I also predicted that counterfactual seekers would 
show a decrease in upward counterfactuals and an increase in downward counterfactuals 
more than those who did not seek. A 2 (seek vs. did not seek) x 2 (time 1 vs. time 2) 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed the predicted interaction for upward 
counterfactuals, F(1,134) = 5.29,  p = .02, ηp2 = .04; see Figure 4.  Upward 
counterfactuals decreased more for counterfactual-seekers (Ms = 5.27 vs. 3.71, d =1.42) 
than for non-seekers (Ms = 4.62 vs. 3.78, d = 1.19).  Likewise, this interaction emerged 
for downward counterfactuals, F(1,133) = 4.81,  p = .03, ηp2 = .04. Downward 
counterfactuals increased for counterfactual-seekers (Ms = 3.36 vs. 4.18, t(44) = 2.50, p = 
.02, d = 0.75) but did not significantly change for non-seekers (Ms = 2.79 vs. 2.88, t(89) 
= 0.52, p = .60, d = 0.11). 
 Effects on satisfaction.  Study 4 also examined the effects of counterfactual-
seeking on satisfaction.  A 2 (seek vs. did not seek) x 2 (time 1 vs. time 2) repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed the predicted interaction for satisfaction, F(1, 135) = 5.42, p 
= .02, ηp2 = .04.  Counterfactual seekers showed a greater increase in satisfaction (Ms = 
2.89 vs. 3.84, t(44) = 3.10, p = .003, d = 0.93) than those who did not seek this 
information (Ms = 3.46 vs. 3.76, t(91) = 2.43, p = .02, d = 0.51).   
I further predicted that these changes in satisfaction would be associated with a 
shift toward less imaginative and more factual views of the alternative.  In a regression 
predicting time 2 satisfaction while controlling for satisfaction and thoughts at time 1, 
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fewer time 2 imaginative thoughts were associated with improved satisfaction, β = -.23, 
t(131) = 2.18, p = .03.  However, time 2 factual thoughts were not associated with 
improved satisfaction, β = -.05, t(131) = .44, p = .66.  Thus, the shift in imaginative 
thoughts was central to the changes in satisfaction. 
Mediation by counterfactual thoughts. I predicted that the effects of 
imaginative thoughts on satisfaction would be mediated by changes in counterfactual 
thoughts.  In a regression controlling for upward counterfactuals and imaginative 
thoughts at time 1, time 2 imaginative thoughts were significant predictors of time 2 
upward counterfactuals, β = .51, t(133) = 6.31, p < .001. Supporting a meditational 
argument, the effect of imaginative thoughts on satisfaction became non-significant (β = 
.003, t(132) = 0.04, p = .97) when upward counterfactuals were added as a predictor (β = 
-.50, t(132) = 6.05, p < .001).  A Sobel (1982) test confirmed significant mediation, z = 
4.39, p < .001.   
I also predicted that upward counterfactuals would partially mediate the effects of 
counterfactual-seeking on satisfaction.  Counterfactual-seeking was not significantly 
rated to time 2 satisfaction (β = .09, t(134) = 1.45, p = .13) when upward counterfactuals 
were added as a predictor (β = -.47, t(134) = 6.58, p < .001).  A Sobel (1982) test was 
marginally significant, z = 1.66, p = .09, indicating that upward counterfactuals partially 
mediated the effect of counterfactual-seeking on satisfaction, in line with Step 3 for 
Figure 1. 
However, downward counterfactuals were not associated with either factual or 
imaginative thoughts in regressions of these time 2 variables controlling for time 1 (for 
factual thoughts, β = .10, t(131) =  0.94, p = .35; for imaginative thoughts, β = .03, t(132) 
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= 0.28, p = .78), indicating that contrary to predictions downward counterfactuals were 
not a mediator of the effect of thought content on satisfaction.   
I also examined whether downward counterfactuals would mediate the effects of 
counterfactual-seeking on satisfaction.  Although counterfactual-seeking was not 
significantly related to satisfaction when downward counterfactuals were added to a 
regression (β = .10, t(133) = 1.51, p = .13), the effect of downward counterfactuals in this 
regression was only marginally significant (β = .14, t(133) = 1.80, p = .07), as was the 
Sobel test, z = 1.64, p = .10.  Downward counterfactuals do not appear to be central to the 
effects of counterfactual-seeking in regulating regret. 
Discussion 
Study 4 examined counterfactual thoughts as a mechanism for improving 
satisfaction. I predicted that, along with changes in satisfaction, changes in counterfactual 
thoughts would occur following counterfactual-seeking.  In particular, I predicted that 
thoughts about the alternative would be more factual (what would have been) than 
imaginative (what might have been) in nature following counterfactual-seeking.  
Following seeking, factual thoughts about the foregone option increased, supporting this 
prediction. Moreover, changes in imaginative thoughts about the foregone options were 
associated with changes in satisfaction, as predicted, with reduced imaginative thoughts 
associated with improved satisfaction (though factual thoughts were not significantly 
related to this change).  Likewise, participants reported more upward counterfactuals and 
fewer downward counterfactuals after seeking; these changes were both associated with 
improved satisfaction, and upward counterfactuals partially mediated the effects of 
changes in thought content.  In addition to replicating the finding that counterfactual-
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seeking reduces dissatisfaction, Study 4 finds counterfactual-seeking changes cognition 
as well, and that these cognitive effects, particularly reductions in imaginative thoughts 
and upward counterfactuals, are related to the changes in satisfaction.  
General Discussion 
The present research used a new paradigm to investigate the phenomenon of 
counterfactual-seeking, the deliberate decision to seek information about foregone 
alternatives.  Consistent with the role of regret in past research (Shani, Tykocinski, & 
Zeelenberg, 2008; Shani & Zeelenberg, 2007), negative outcomes (Study 1) and 
subjective dissatisfaction (Study 2) were associated with greater counterfactual seeking.  
This research also investigated the affective (Study 2-4) and cognitive (Study 4) 
consequences of counterfactual-seeking.  In Study 2, counterfactual seeking improved 
satisfaction when the chosen alternative was equivalent or somewhat superior to the 
foregone alternative; there was no parallel decrease in satisfaction when the foregone 
alternative was superior.  Study 3 revealed that this benefit was not specific to those who 
chose to view information, but extended to those who were randomly assigned to read 
this information as well.  Finally, Study 4 illustrated the role of counterfactual thoughts in 
this improvement of satisfaction, in particular the shift of thoughts from being highly 
imaginative to become relatively more factual after viewing counterfactual information. 
The present results indicate that individuals are not uniformly regret averse.  
Instead, when they are currently experiencing regret, they become more willing to seek 
out information about foregone alternatives.  This is made all the more notable by the fact 
that in Study 2, participants reported that they expected to be upset by this counterfactual 
information. Although apparently contradictory, this pattern may explain why the present 
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results differ from those of Zeelenberg (1999; Zeelenberg et al., 1996).  In that research, 
the decision to view counterfactual information was part of the initial decision process; in 
that case, participants could expect to be upset without having any current emotion to 
balance that expectation against, which would lead them to avoid information about 
foregone alternatives.  In this paradigm, as in most real life decisions, the decision to seek 
counterfactual information came after the initial decision and its outcome, when 
participants had an experienced emotion to weigh against the expectation of being upset, 
which here led them to choose to seek out this information in spite of the potential pain it 
could bring.  Given the strong effects of experienced emotions (Frijda, 1986), 
experienced regret may simply outweigh anticipated regret.  Alternatively, if individuals 
construe their initial dissatisfaction as “disappointment” (the outcome is worse than 
expectations) rather than “regret” (the outcome is worse than what they might have 
obtained from another decision) they may see potential regret as an improvement on 
experienced disappointment, given past findings that individuals find regret more 
beneficial than disappointment (Saffrey, Summerville, & Roese, 2008). 
Despite participants’ anticipated regret about counterfactual-seeking, 
counterfactual-seeking was generally able to improve satisfaction, regardless of whether 
individuals had chosen or been assigned to learn about the foregone alternative.  This 
result is consistent with the prediction from cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 
1957), that individuals will respond to dissatisfaction by increasing their favorable beliefs 
about the chosen option and increasing negative beliefs about the foregone option 
(Brehm, 1956).  In this case, individuals moved away from having relatively imaginary 
thoughts about the foregone options to having more factual thoughts, suggesting that 
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there is a dissatisfaction-reducing shift from what might have been to what would have 
been.   In addition to the long-term, behavioral benefits of counterfactual information 
(e.g., Landman, 1993; Smallman & Roese, 2009; Zeelenberg, Inman, & Pieters, 2001), it 
therefore appears to have a short-term affective value in highlighting possible rather than 
idealized alternatives. 
Although the present research used a new paradigm that allows participants to 
make their choice to seek information about foregone alternatives after experiencing 
post-decisional regret, improving external validity over previous approaches, it will be 
important to extend this research into decisions with real personal or economic 
consequences.  Likewise, the only cost of seeking information here was the time spent 
reading; in daily life, obtaining information can incur additional costs.  It will be 
important to examine how individuals balance those costs against the influence of 
experienced dissatisfaction demonstrated here.   Nevertheless, the present research both 
improves psychological realism relative to previous paradigms for examining interest in 
counterfactual information and, for the first time, examines the short-term consequences 
of viewing this information. 
Rather than uniformly shielding themselves from regret, on the one hand, or 
denying the potential pain counterfactual information might bring, on the other, decision-
makers in the present research instead willingly risked the pain of regret in service of 
other motives. These findings suggest that decision makers’ considerations of 
counterfactual information are subject to a nuanced calculus of both experienced and 
anticipated regret.  
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Notes: 
1 Although some other research has termed this phenomenon information-seeking, 
counterfactual-seeking better disambiguates seeking information about what might have 
been from other kinds of information-seeking, e.g., seeking absolute feedback or social-
comparison information about performance (Northcraft & Ashford, 1990), information 
about one’s health status (Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd, 2010), or seeking 
information about decision objects prior to (vs. following) the decision. 
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Figure 1  
Proposed model of counterfactual-seeking 
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Figure 2 
Study 3 results.  Mean ratings of satisfaction (with standard errors) at Time 1 and Time 2 
for participants given free choice to read or not read counterfactual information (i.e., 
seekers and non-seekers) and participants randomly assigned by the experimenter to read 
or not read this information. 
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Figure 3 
Study 4 results.  Mean ratings (with standard errors) of the extent to which thoughts of 
counterfactual-seekers and non-seekers were factual or imaginative at Time 1 and Time 
2. 
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Figure 4  
Study 4 results.  Mean ratings (with standard errors) of upward and downward 
counterfactual thoughts by counterfactual-seekers and non-seekers at Time 1 and Time 2. 
 
 
